Citation Sources and the New York Court of Appeals by Bobinski, Mary Anne
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 34 Number 3 Article 8 
10-1-1985 
Citation Sources and the New York Court of Appeals 
Mary Anne Bobinski 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Judges Commons, and the Legal Writing and Research Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mary A. Bobinski, Citation Sources and the New York Court of Appeals, 34 Buff. L. Rev. 965 (1985). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol34/iss3/8 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
COMMENTS
Citation Sources and the New York Court of
Appeals
INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE OF THE INQUIRY
C OURT citation practice is an objective measure of judicial be-
havior which, it can be hypothesized, will vary with the type
of issue before the court. In citing a particular source to support
their processes of decision making, judges are both seeking legiti-
macy and legitimizing the source used.' Practicing attorneys must
select and assert authority in their roles as adversaries. Similarly,
legal scholars are interested in the use of such authority by the
courts, in part as an indication of the process of judicial decision
making. 2 Variation in citation practice that can be related to the
subject matter of the suit before the court may provide useful in-
formation about the judicial process attorneys and legal scholars
alike.
What sources of knowledge do courts turn to when providing
authority for their decisions? What sources are seen as legitimate,
and thus given legitimacy by citation in court opinions? By study-
ing the citation practices of the New York Court of Appeals, it is
hoped that the influence of various sources, and the legitimacy of
the use of some sources, can be quantified. This information is
relevant to two audiences. To the scholar interested in judicial de-
cision making, a study of the court's citation practices can provide
objective empirical evidence on the sources of the court's legal
reasoning.3 To the practicing lawyer, such a study can illuminate
1. Merryman, The Authority of Authority, 6 STm. L. REv. 613, 616 (1954). Professor
Merryman initiated the study of court citation practices with this study of the California
Supreme Court.
2. Id. at 613. See infra notes 3 & 10-15.
3. Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Su-
preme Court Opinions October Terms 1900, 1940 and 1978, 76 LAw Lina. J. 1, 4 (1983).
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those sources of legal reasoning that best persuade the court."
In this study, the citation practices of the New York Court of
Appeals were analyzed through the use of sample cases from par-
ticular areas of law selected from three different years (1963,
1973, and 1983). Cases from four different areas of law were sam-
pled: constitutional, criminal, "concriminal" (cases falling within
both the constitutional and criminal categories), and negligence.
Differences in citation practice over time and between types .of
cases were found. Court citation practice in particular areas of law
varied widely. Cases involving constitutional issues invoked a
fuller use of authority than did those involving negligence or
criminal issues alone. Suits containing negligence issues generally
cited to more authority than those involving criminal issues. In all
of these groups, differences were found in the types of authority
cited by the court.
The scope of the conclusions which can be drawn from this
study must be circumscribed. Such a study will obviously be un-
derinclusive-its results "reflect only the superficiality of citation
and not the deep undercurrents of unacknowledged reliance." 5
Two other factors will be left out of the empirical results: "[T]he
citation of precedent may represent (and leave unstated) a bundle
of reasons that lie behind why the precedent is persuasive. There
is. . .much unstated legal and social philosophy behind any deci-
sion,"' and policy arguments are often similarly left out of written
opinions." Thus, these objective measures of the forces at work in
a judge's process of legal reasoning must, to a certain degree, be
inadequate. But the style and content of opinions is the guide to
which we have access, and analysis of these characteristics might
allow us to glimpse the inner workings of judicial decision making,
even if all we discern are those sources which judges perceive to
be legitimate authority upon which to base decisions.8 Judicial
opinions do not tell what is going on in judges' minds. "It may be
mere rationalization. But. . .the opinion and its reasoning show
4. Id.
5. Scurlock, Scholarship and the Courts, 32 UMKC L. REv. 228, 230 (1964). Professor
Scurlock studied Missouri, California, New York, and Supreme Court citation practices.
6. T. MARVELS, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAwYERS 108-09 (1978).
7. Id. at 108-09. See also Waits, Values, Intuitions, and Opinion Writing: The Judicial Pro-
cess and State Court Jurisdiction, 1983 U. ILL L. REv. 917, 926-27.
8. Friedman, Kagan, Cartwright & Wheeler, State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and
Citation, 33 STAN. L. REv. 773, 773 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Friedman].
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what judges think is legitimate argument and legitimate authority,
justifying their behavior.""
A knowledge of this perception of legitimacy is essential for
the lawyer since it is the advocate's responsibility to bring not only
precedent, but social facts and value choices before the courts. 10
Given the time constraints on appellate courts, the advocate's
brief must be concise while bringing as much information to bear
on the issue as possible." A knowledge of appropriate sources can
thus aid the lawyer.
In the past thirty years researchers have examined the cita-
tion practices of various courts. The Supreme Court's citation
practices have received great attention. 2 Individual state court
practices have also been studied. One example is John Henry Mer-
ryman's extensive study of the California Supreme Court.' 3 The
Maryland Court of Appeals 14 and the North Carolina Supreme
Court have also been subjects of inquiry.' 5 William Landes and
9. Id. at 794 (emphasis in original).
10. Leflar, Quality in Judicial Opinions, 3 PACE L. REv. 579, 581 (1983); Waits, supra
note 7, at 923 n.44, 926. Waits warns against lawyers' temptation to skirt value issues in
court briefs:
One undesirable side effect of the profession's lack of candor on the value ques-
tion is that lawyers may fail to bring to the court's attention important value-
related arguments. Lawyers trained in the "law-as-a-series-of-rules" tradition
may fail to see value issues altogether; other advocates may fear backlash from
the court if such arguments are perceived as appeals to irrationality and emo-
tionalism. In truth, the court needs the adversaries' help on policy issues as
much as it does on questions of fact. If the parties do not identify and argue the
relevant value choices, no guarantee exists that the court will spot them by
itself.
Id. at 927.
11. S. WAsBY, T. MARvELL & A. AIKMAN, VOLUME AND DELAY IN STATE APPELLATE
COURTS: PROBLEMS AND RESPONSES 86-88 (1979). From a judicial perspective:
My experience has been that appellate briefs and arguments on the whole insuf-
ficiently set the case in the broader context of the legal and jurisprudential mo-
saic. Because of the volume of our work, ever increasing, the individual mem-
bers of the court have little time to indulge in research and cogitation beyond
the close borders of the case at hand.
Jones, Cogitations on Appellate Decision-Making, 52 N.Y. ST. B.J. 189, 215 (1980).
12. Daniels, supra note 3. See also Landes & Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249; Scurlock, supra note 5.
13. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of
the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL L. REv. 381 (1977).
14. Reynolds, The Court of Appeals of Maryland: Roles, Work and Performance, 38 MD. L.
REv. 148 (1978). Professor Reynolds focused on the high court of Maryland in part because
of the dearth of studies on this type of influential court. Id. at 148.
15. Mann, The North Carolina Supreme Court 1977: A Statistical Analysis, 15 WAKE FOR-
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Richard Posner have conducted a study of the citation practices of
various courts.16 In addition, an extensive study of a number of
state supreme courts has been conducted, producing several schol-
arly articles analyzing citation practice.
1 7
Only one study to date has included an analysis of the New
York Court of Appeals citation practices.18 John Scurlock ex-
amined the citation practices of several state courts in the area of
criminal law. His study concentrated on the use of legal treatises,
law review articles, and reference works in court opinions in crim-
inal cases. Scurlock found that the use of such sources varied be-
tween courts, and that a total of thirty-one percent of the opinions
studied did cite to one of these sources.19 Twenty-five percent of
the New York Court of Appeals cases studied, written between
1959 and 1962, contained citations to sources other than cases
and statutes. 0 Because this study was conducted twenty-five years
ago, it would provide an informative contrast to more recently
collected data presented here.
I. THE STUDY
In this section the methodology of the study will be explored.
In addition, the general areas of opinion practice at issue will be
examined. The usefulness and limits of this study's results can best
be understood through a thorough knowledge of the methodol-
ogy employed. An explanation of the issues studied will aid in un-
derstanding the significance of the data presented in the next
section.
FsT L. REv. 39 (1979).
16. Landes & Posner, supra note 12. Landes and Posner utilize an economic frame-
work in which precedents are viewed as constituting a stock of legal capital, subject to
depreciation and production. Id. at 250-51.
17. Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman & Wheeler, The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76
MICH. L. REv. 961, 963 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Kagan]. See also Friedman, supra note 8.
18. Scurlock, supra note 5, at 230-31.
19. Id. at 228. Conversely, 69% of the examined decisions "rested exclusively on cases,
statutes or rules of court." Id.
20. Id. at 238. Scurlock also presents a list of treatises and law review articles cited in
the criminal case sample. This list will be compared to more recent results. See infra text
accompanying notes 75-89.
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A. Design
Many authors have suggested the use of legal computer pro-
grams in aiding scholarly research." This study was aided by the
availability of the Westlaw data base. Queries were used to locate
New York Court of Appeals cases which had certain characteris-
tics. 2 2 A sample of cases was then read and analyzed. The analysis
focused on different issues, 3 concentrating on factors which could
be objectively measured, including opinion length and the num-
ber and type of citations to authority. The data was then com-
pared to available data from New York State and other states.
The sample was divided into two basic dimensions: time and
subject matter. Time periods ten years apart were selected for
study: 1963, 1973, and 1983. A longitudinal study of this nature
allows for evolution in the philosophy of the court.2 4 An examina-
tion of several years increases the possibility that patterns of cita-
tion practice will emerge. 5 It must be noted, however, that there
is no certainty that the years selected are not anomalous in one or
more respects. Various factors, such as the stability of the mem-
bership of the court, can affect citation practice. The membership
of the New York Court of Appeals remained fairly constant
within each year chosen, although it changed across the length of
the study. 6
The second dimension of the division is subject matter. Four
different categories of law were chosen for each of the three test
21. See, e.g., Daniels, supra note 3, at 27-28.
22. The characteristics are the year of the decision and the topic of the case. For a
more detailed description of the methodology, see infra note 31.
23. See infra text accompanying note 27.
24. See Merryman, supra note 13, at 381.
25. Id. at 382.
26. The judges of the court of appeals during the 1983 term were: Chief Judge Law-
rence H. Cooke and Associate Judges Matthew J. Jasen, Hugh R. Jones, Sol Wachtler, Ber-
nard S. Meyer, Richard D. Simons and Judith C. Kaye (appointed September 6, 1983, fol-
lowing the resignation of Jacob D. Fuchsberg). See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1982-1983
MANUAL FOR THE USE OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 893 (1983). Judges
of the court of appeals during the 1973 term were: Chief Judge Stanley H. Fuld and Asso-
ciate Judges Adrian P. Burke, Charles D. Breitel, Matthew J. Jasen, Dominick L. Gabrielli,
Hugh R. Jones and Sol Wachtler. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1973 MANUAL FOR THE USE OF
THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 1098 (1973). Judges of the court of appeals
during the 1963 term were: ChiefJudge Charles S. Desmond and Associate Judges Marvin
R. Dye, Stanley H. Fuld, John Van Voorhis, Adrian D. Burke, Sydney F. Foster and John
F. Scileppi. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1963 MANUAL FOR THE USE OF THE LEGISLATURE OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK 912 (1964).
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years: criminal, constitutional, "concriminal" and negligence
cases. Criminal cases are defined as those listed under the Westlaw
criminal topic, but not the constitutional topic. Constitutional
cases are similarly defined as those constitutional cases not cross-
listed with the .criminal category. Thus, another category, "con-
criminal" can be used to define those cases classified under both
topics. Negligence cases, of course, are defined by their classifica-
tion under that topic. This use of exclusive topic categories, that
is, categories that cannot contain the same cases, provides a basis
for the use of various statistical tests.27 In addition, the testing of
hypotheses regarding different citation practices between catego-
ries is clearer if the categories are exclusive. The effect of the
presence of criminal or constitutional issues, or both types of is-
sues, within a case may be more clearly observed. 8
Many scholars have noted that court citation may vary ac-
cording to the subject matter of the suit, and that court caseloads
in different types of suits have changed over time. 29 These four
categories were chosen for analysis here because of the differing
types of disputes they presented to the court for resolution.
Random samples of the court cases were taken in two areas:
constitutional and criminal law. A population universe80 was ob-
tained containing all court of appeals cases dealing with these
Westlaw topics for each of the three years. A random sample was
then drawn from the cases in each category."' Cases which fell
27. The use of the Chi Square test, for example, is aided through the use of exclusive
categories. H. REYNow s, ANALYSIS OF NOMINAL DATA 19 (2d ed. 1984). A drawback of the
use of such catagories is that they become less representative. The class of "constitutional"
cases with criminal cases removed may no longer provide accurate information about con-
stitutional cases as a whole.
28. In their study of federal court case citation practices, Landes and Posner utilize a
similar method of separating criminal from constitutional issues and examining the effect
of the presence of both. Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 253.
29. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 17, at 1004; Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 252;
Scurlock, supra note 5, at 228.
30. The "population universe" is the set of all entities which contain the characteris-
tics under study. In this case it includes all criminal, constitutional, and negligence cases for
the three study years.
31. Technically, random sampling from such categories may be termed stratified ran-
dom sampling. H. BLAIocx, SOCIAL STATimSTcS 393-96, 437-40 (1960). A Westlaw query was
formulated, containing the name of the court, the desired year (1963, 1973 or 1983) and
the West topic desired (constitutional, criminal, or negligence law). A population universe
was obtained for all court of appeals cases involving these topics for each of the three
years. Random samples were taken in the first two categories. Cases which appeared in
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within both categories were set aside as a separate category, "con-
criminal" cases.
Several factors led to the use of these categories. First, crimi-
nal and constitutional cases make up a large part of many state
high court caseloads, and this percentage is increasing.32 Second,
these categories represent two different sorts of disputes. Follow-
ing Robert Kagan's typology, criminal cases represent public law
disputes, which can be seen as the exertion of public power on the
individual.33 Constitutional cases can be seen as representing a
similar type of dispute, but with the force reversed-an attempt
to exert individual interests upon the public. The differing nature
of these disputes may be reflected in differing sources of citation.
In addition, several hypotheses have been presented with re-
gard to court practices in these areas. Katherine Waits argues that
constitutional law is more "value-laden" than other types of law."4
This argument implies that values and societal beliefs must be
presented to the court by lawyers, and that such sources of infor-
mation will appear in court citation. 5 Scurlock, in his study of
criminal cases in several state courts, argues that citation practice
in this category might be more conservative, emphasizing statutes
and caselaw. 8 Data from another study supports the hypothesis
that courts decide these cases differently. Ron Steinberg, in his
more recent study of the voting practices of the judges on the
New York Court of Appeals, notes that "[j]udges in New York
apparently see the appeals of those threatened with criminal pros-
ecution and physical detention from a perspective fundamentally
different from that operating with respect to those suffering per-
sonal injury, property damage, or loss of work.1
37
both the criminal and constitutional categories were separated out. The samples in each
resultant category were checked to ensure that at least a 10% sample of the total possible
number of cases had been obtained. In certain categories an additional random sampling
was performed to assure that this minimum percentage was contained in the sample. All of
the cases under the negligence heading were analyzed.
32. See Kagan, supra note 17, at 987-88.
33. Id.
34. Waits, supra note 7, at 926.
35. Id.
36. Scurlock, supra note 5, at 228.
37. Steinberg, Sympathetic Voting Dimensions on the New York Court of Appeals, 41 ALB. L.
REV. 699, 730 (1977). Professor Steinberg examines judicial voting behavior through an
analysis of individual judge characteristics, following the line of research developed by
Glendon Schubert. See, e.g., G. ScnmuaRT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JuDIcIAL BEHAVIOR
1985]
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The last cate-gory of cases studied were those listed under the
negligence heading. This group represents a different type of dis-
pute-one between private parties. Negligence law has undergone
great changes over the past twenty years.38 Because the number of
cases in this group was small, each could be analyzed.
The initial random samples from the criminal and constitu-
tional categories, when divided into exclusive groups, provided a
sample of less than ten percent of the total possible number of
cases for some year-category combinations. An additional random
sample was obtained, including a number of cases sufficient to
bring the percentage of cases studied in the sample to a minimum
of ten percent. There are also three 1963, four 1973 and seven
1983 New York Court of Appeals cases classified under the
Westlaw negligence heading that were included in the study. This
brought the total number of cases analyzed to sixty-eight (see Ap-
pendix A for a list of cases analyzed). Although at least one stu-
dent of court citation practice has used this minimum percentage
standard for sample size, 9 valid sample size is determined with
reference to the variability of the population universe, not size
alone.4 0 Therefore, it is difficult to determine an appropriate sam-
ple size without a knowledge of the variability of the criteria to be
(1959).
In a recent law review article, the Honorable Sol Wachtler, Chief Judge of the New
York Court of Appeals, recognized the potential for differential judicial response to differ-
ent types of disputes. Wachtler, Stare Decisis and a changing Court of Appeals, 59 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 445 (1985). The judge noted that the concept of stare decisis plays a more impor-
tant role in cases "involving wills, title to land, commercial transactions, and contracts,"
statutory interpretation, and those invoking long standing commitment to a particular pol-
icy. Id. at 449. In contrast, commitment to stare decisis might be less firm in several areas
examined in this study. Judge Wachtler noted that "courts more readily examine rules they
themselves have promulgated, for example common-law rules of tort liability." Id. at 453.
This may be implicated in this study's analysis of citation practice in negligence cases. The
judge also noted the rule's weaknesses in constitutional interpretation and criminal cases (at
least where adherence to precedence would injure a criminal defendant). Id. Here, too, the
categories chosen for study may represent those where stare decisis plays a comparatively
meager role in the settlement of disputes. The range of citation sources may reflect this
fact, for, where the force of stare decisis is weakened, a court may more freely turn to a
multitude of legal and extra-legal sources of authority.
38. Laufer, Tort Law in Transition: Charles S. Desmond's Quarter-Century on the New York
Court of Appeals, 15 BUFFALO L. REv. 276, 280 (1965). See also Wachtler, supra note 37, at
453 n.44.
39. Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 252.
40. W. DANIEL & J. TERRELL, BUSINESS STATISTICS: BAsIC CONCEPTS AND METHODOLOGY
171-80 (1983). The equation for determining sample size is given as:
972 [Vol. 34
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measured. An attempt to approximate the variability and deter-
mine an appropriate sample size leads to the conclusion that an
extremely large number of cases would have to be studied."1 In
this study a certain degree of statistical vigor has been sacrificed
to the constraints of time and other resources. The results,
though not statistically valid, are similar enough to the results of
other state studies to provide some assurance of sufficiency. 42 Fig-
ure 1 summarizes the sample sizes of this study and gives the sam-
ple size as a percentage of the total possible number of cases.
To those who view citation practice as a matter of an individ-
ual judge's preference, its study may seem to be a "dubious under-
taking."143 Yet, as Posner notes on the citation of caselaw prece-
dent: "the question whether or not the use of precedents is
systematic does not have to be decided on a priori grounds; to the
extent that judicial citation practices exhibit regularities explica-
ble within a systematic analytic framework, a statistical analysis of
precedent should reveal them." 4
n = Nz'a
d2(N- 1 )+22
where: N = population size;
Z = standard normal variable;
61 = population variance; and
d = the confidence interval desired.
Id. at 173.
41. One method of estimating the population variance is to utilize whatever variance
is found in an initial sample. Id. at 172. Utilizing this method and the sample size equation
for estimating the mean, it was determined that a sample size of several hundred would be
required for some categories. Since this number of cases did not exist, only the analysis of
the entire population would have met this statistical test.
42. The sample validity can be tested to some degree in comparison with data from
other states. Severely anamolous differences might indicate a sampling error in the study.
Conversely, where results fit a general trend which is presumed to have applicability within
this state, sample validity is supported. See infra text accompanying notes 65-66. See infra
Figure I for a chart representing sample size and population percentages.
43. Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 251.
44. Id. at 252.
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YEAR TOPIC SAMPLE SIZE TOTAL POPULATION PERCENT
(No. Cases (No. Possible Cases) (Cases Studied/
Studied) Total No. Cases)
1963 CONSTITUTIONAL 6 6 100
CRIMINAL 7 26 26.92
CONCRIMINAL 2 4 50
NEGLIGENCE 3 3 100
TOTAL 18 39 46.15
1973
CONSTITUTIONAL 7 10 70
CRIMINAL 7 27 25.93
CONCRIMINAL 4 5 80
NEGLIGENCE 4 4 100
TOTAL 22 46 47.83
1983
CONSTITUTIONAL 8 23 34.78
CRIMINAL 11 91 12.09
CONCRIMINAL 1 2 50
NEGLIGENCE 7 7 100
TOTAL 27 123 21.95
Figure 1: Sample Size And Percentage of Population Studies
B. Issues
1. Opinion Length. Opinion length is important for several rea-
sons. First, it is a measure of the sheer magnitude of the legal
reasoning in the opinion. Studies have noted the relationship be-
tween opinion length and court caseload, 4' and also between the
"importance" of a case (as measured by subsequent citations) and
the length of the opinion . 6 The use of page length can also mod-
ify the significance of some statistical findings. Thus, one could
find that constitutional opinions contain a great many more cites
than criminal opinions. The significance of this finding could be
mitigated by the discovery that the number of citations per page
(or other measure) is equivalent.
Page length, a typical measure of opinion length, 7 could not
be used consistently in this study because the reporter for the
New York Court of Appeals (New York Reports) has changed for-
mat and typeface over the years. Hence, this data was of little
practical use for comparisons. The number of words per opinion
45. Friedman, supra. note 8, at 783; Kagan, supra note 17, at 971.
46. Kagan, supra note 17, at 991.
47. Friedman, supra note 8, at 775-85.
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was used instead as a measure of opinion length. Rough compari-
sons could then be made between the different categories in this
dimension. Comparisons to data from other studies are limited,
however, by the use of a different standard of measure.
Two different factors might have an effect upon opinion
lengths in the present study. The lengths of opinions exhibited
great differences among categories (see Figure 2). Concriminal
cases were the longest, although they steadily decreased in length
across the sample years. If opinion length is related to the "impor-
tance" of a case, one might expect constitutional cases to have the
next greatest opinion length. Surprisingly, however, negligence
cases were the next longest. A significant change in the negligence
case length also occurs over time, with the longest average length
found in the 1973 year. Constitutional cases do show greater
length than criminal cases, but their length decreases over time.
Criminal cases, with the shortest length, rise and fall in a manner
similar to that shown in the negligence cases.
OPINION LENGTH
6000-
5000.-
4000 -- 
CONSTITUTIONAL
V.- CRIMINAL
WORDS/ 3000-
CASE LCONCRIMINAL
O] NEGLIGENCE
2000-
1000-
0-
1963 1973 1983
YEAR
Figure 2: Opinion Length per Category by Year
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The lengths of the cases differ among categories in ways
which implicate this study's hypotheses about the types of disputes
they represent for resolution by the court. As Lawrence Friedman
and his colleagues noted: "[i]t seems reasonable to assume that
judges write shorter opinions ...for cases they perceive to be
'easy'-clearly controlled by precedent-and longer ones in cases
they feel are legally difficult, or politically controversial, or liable
to have major social impact.' '48 It is in these difficult cases that one
might expect the court to call on different and wider sources of
authority for its decisions. Under this reasoning, the topic cases of
this study should show differences in citation style reflecting dif-
ferences in the difficulty of the decision before the court.
Less clearly related to the value-laden nature of a particular
case is the length of any concurring or dissenting opinion which
appears (see Figure 3). Majority opinions exceed both other types
of opinions in length, substantially so in the 1973 year. The aver-
age length of concurrences is relatively constant in 1963 and
1973, but increases in the 1983 sample, where it exceeds the aver-
age length of dissenting opinions. Dissenting opinions remain rela-
tively constant in length over time. The implications of these dif-
ferences are unclear. One significant result of this analysis of
opinion length is the observed substantial increase in majority
opinion length for the 1973 year. It would appear that the court
majority was resolving less straightforward issues in this year. It is
puzzling, however, that dissent length did not show a correspond-
ing increase in 1973.
Opinion length measured across time showed no clear pat-
tern. This result is at odds with the notion that increases in court
caseload affect opinion length inversely.4 9 This provides further
support for the hypothesis that the court was engaged in complex
dispute resolution in those areas in which opinion length in-
creased, despite an increased caseload.
48. Friedman, supra note 8, at 777. Cases which have more "issues" might also be
longer. Certain topics may be more likely to involve more than one issue.
49. Kagan, supra note 17, at 971.
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Figure 3: Opinion Length/Type Opinion/Year
2. Rates of Concurrence and Dissent. While opinion length
may be an indicator of the amount of legal reasoning represented
in the cases, the dissent rate may represent the use of a particular
style of legal reasoning. One extensive study of state courts has
shown that dissent rates may increase as policy issues are brought
into the judicial decision making process.5 While most cases on
the state level are typically decided unanimously, 51 interesting re-
lationships have been drawn in the rate of dissent over time, and
50. Friedman, supra note 8, at 775-84. The study data supported the hypothesis that
as cases deal more with policy decisions, dissent rate increases. Individual judges may iden-
tify their obligations to unaniminity differently, but at least one New York Court of Ap-
peals judge advocates restraint in the writing of concurring and dissenting opinions. The
judge would limit the writing of separate opinions to either those cases with federal or
constitutional issues that have the potential to reach the Supreme Court, or those cases
that one's sense of integrity or principle compels the writing of a separate opinion. See
Jones, supra note 11, at 218-19, 222.
51. Friedman, supra note 8, at 786-87.
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in the decisions of particular judges."2
In the instant study, the sample categories chosen had higher
rates of dissent and concurrence than the rates for all court of
appeals cases (see Figure 4). This may be due to the high visibility
of decisions in these categories. Waits' hypothesis that constitu-
tional cases involve more value choices is supported by the fact
that in the constitutional sample the dissent rates are significantly
greater than those in the criminal sample. Of particular interest
here is the difference between the criminal, constitutional, and
concriminal rates. The concriminal cases had the highest propor-
tion of dissenting opinions, suggesting that these cases presented
particularly contested value choices for the court. Large dissent
rates are also found in the negligence sample for 1983, again sug-
gesting that this area presented difficult choices for the court. Of
interest is the decline in dissent and concurrence rates for both
constitutional and criminal cases. Here the dissent rate remains
high, although it drops briefly in 1973. Negligence cases, on the
contrary, have shown a steady growth in the rate of dissenting
opinions. It would appear that policy considerations have increas-
ingly been at issue in these cases. These trends, including the gen-
eral decrease in the dissent and concurrence rates, have implica-
tions for further investigations. This decline in rates suggests a
lagging interest in policy issues, or possibly a more homogeneous
court. In opposition to the general trend, the higher rates for con-
criminal and negligence cases suggest increasing policy considera-
tions. These differences in dissent and concurrence rates, are simi-
lar to the differences found in opinion length above. 3 This
suggests that the citation sources utilized by the court may exhibit
a change in character, particularly in the 1983 sample.
3. Citation Practices. Several analyses have been performed
on the citation practices of the sample court of appeals cases. Two
basic levels of analysis are used. In the first, a broad statistical ap-
proach is taken. It is here that the average number of citations
(per year, per category, and per type of opinion) are calculated.
52. Mann, supra note 15, at 42-43. Mann examined individual judge participation in
dissents or majorities in criminal and noncriminal cases. Id. at 53. ,
53. In fact, differences in case length may be due to the rate of concurrence or dissent
in different categories. Cases with more of such opinions would undoubtedly be longer
than those in which the rate of occurence for separate opinions was lower. See supra text
accompanying notes 48-49.
978 [Vol. 34
CITATION SOURCES
These statistics provide a broad overview of the citation practices
of the court. They begin to answer the question: "What sources of
knowledge does the court turn to in providing authority for their
decisions?" Further, such data can be used to examine whether
there are differences in the types of citation sources across time,
category or the type of opinion (majority, dissent or concurrence).
The second level of analysis focuses on which particular sources
are used by the court. Here, the court's use of nontraditional cita-
tion sources is examined; sources such as legal treatises, law re-
views, and lay materials are considered nontraditional.
The statistics generated represent some basic quantifiable as-
pects of citation practice that can be compared with courts in
other states.5 4 These statistics can aid in examining the judicially
perceived need for supporting authority across time and category.
Of particular interest here, however, is the examination of the
types of authority cited in the variable situations. Several hypothe-
ses may be implicated in the use of one sort of information source
over another.
55
The first step in analysis, then, is to determine the total num-
ber of citations5" made by the court of appeals in the sample years
and categories per case. As Figure 5 details, there appears to be a
general trend across the three years toward a decrease in average
citation number. The citation totals for the categories show that
this trend is not constant. Negligence citations, for example, have
remained fairly constant through this period, opposing the trend
toward increasing opinion length and rate of dissent noted above.
Concriminal citations presented a different pattern, decreasing in
1973 but rising in 1983. This too seems unrelated to the opinion
length pattern found above. Constitutional and criminal cases
showed a general decrease in the average number of citations per
case.
54. See Friedman, supra note 8, at 796-817; Merryman, supra note 13, at 389-91.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 69-96. See also Merryman, supra note 1, at 621-
26.
56. A "citation," as defined for the purposes of this study, is a reference to a case,
statute, legal treatise (including legal encyclopedias and restatements), law review article, or
other source (i.e., citations to nonlegal works or periodicals). The sources are considered
the relevant subject for study. Therefore, multiple citations to the same source are not
considered relevant if they appear in the same case. See, e.g., Merryman, supra note 13, at
388.
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Figure 5: Average Citation/Case by Topic
Concriminal cases contained the greatest number of average
citations per case, followed by the constitutional, negligence and
criminal cases, in that order. Citation practice as a whole seems to
be related to category in the same way that other objective mea-
sures of opinion style were affected. Concriminal cases again seem
to have presented the greatest difficulty for the court in dispute
resolution. Constitutional citations were, as would be expected,
greater in number than those in the criminal cases. A greater
number of citations would be expected in this area because it is
more value laden, 57 and because courts are here exercising their
most powerful function-setting limits on the power of the legis-
lature.58 Negligence cases also had a greater number of average
cites per case than criminal cases. This result follows from the
analysis of page length and dissent rate discussed above.59
57. See supra text accompanying note 34.
58. See Reynolds, supra note 14, at 161-63.
59. See supra note 57.
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The criminal cases exhibited the sharpest change between
1973 and 1983. During this period, the number of citations per
case took a steep drop, after actually increasing somewhat be-
tween 1963 and 1973. Perhaps this rise and fall in criminal case
citation can be correlated with the rise and fall of concern with
criminal cases on appeal. The increase during citation number ap-
pears to be "real," that is, it is not related to any corresponding
increase in concurrence and dissent rate, although opinion length
did increase during this period. 0
The actual decrease in the average number of citations per
case in some categories can also be related to the work load of the
court. Kagan and his colleagues, in their study of state courts,
noted a relationship between the court's workload and its opinion
length (which is positively correlated with the number of cita-
tions).6" New York has also experienced an increase in the num-
ber of appeals brought and decisions reached.62 Thus, the de-
crease in citations per case can be the result of several factors,
including court caseload, and a change in the policy nature of the
questions coming before the court.
There may be another factor of great significance in estimat-
ing the court's use of sources as authority. Figures 6-8 show the
average number of citations per opinion for each of the study
years. Here the influence of both category and rate of concur-
rence and dissent can be seen. This statistic represents the num-
ber of citations per opinion; thus, majority, concurring, and dis-
senting opinions are counted as separate entities within each
category. Distinguishing them as such significantly changes the re-
sults. In 1963 the court's majority opinions actually exhibited rela-
tively consistent values for average citation per opinion, with the
noticeable exception of the criminal category. The average cita-
tions per opinion in this category were less than half that of the
other categories. Constitutional cases actually had a slightly
greater average than the concriminal cases, which had the same
average as the negligence cases. The dissent averages are high for
60. Id.
61. See Kagan, supra note 17, at 992. In the present study, an overall correlation coef-
ficient of 0.91 was found between opinion length and citation number. This indicates a
very strong relationship between the two measures. See infra Appendix B.
62. See, e.g., J. BELLACOSA, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CLERK OF THE COURT TO THE JUDGES
OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS apps. 4B & 5A (1977).
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constitutional and concriminal cases, which to a degree supports
the hypotheses that these types of opinions are more value-
laden.63 The dissent averages here are significantly greater than
those in the criminal and negligence categories. The concurrence
averages are difficult to characterize, in part because concurrence
usage is less than that of the dissents. One anomalous result is the
greater citation use in the concurrence of the criminal cases than
in any majority opinion type. Concurring opinions in this category
appeared to use a large number of sources to support the deci-
sions of the majority.
1963
18-
16.
14-
12.
CITES/ 10'
OPINION 8,
6,
4
2-
W MAJORITY
MCONCURRING
]DISSENT
II ~
CONST GRIM CONCRIM NEG
TOPIC
Figure 6: Average Citation/Topic by Opinion Type: 1963
63. See Friedman, supra note 8. It seems reasonable to expect that citation practices
might follow a similar pattern. Waits hypothesizes that constitutional cases present the
most value-laden issues for the courts. See supra text accompanying note 34. In this study,
concriminal cases consistently exhibited a greater dissent rate, length and citation number
than either constitutional or criminal cases. See infra Figure 2, and supra text accompany-
ing notes 48 & 57. These different objective measures of court behavior can be related to a
court's perception of the need to engage in extensive legal reasoning and to the need for
legi-
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The majority opinions for 1973 all show a great increase in
the average number of citations. Concriminal cases assert their
dominance in citation number, with constitutional, negligence,
and criminal cases following. The dissenting and concurring opin-
ions decreased in importance in terms of inflating the average
number of citations per case. The number of citations in the dis-
senting opinions for concriminal cases remained constant, while
decreasing in the other categories. Citation in criminal concurring
opinions remained significant, although at lower levels.
1973
40-
30- 
[ MAJORITY
CITES/ 20"- CONCURRING
OPINION 0 DISSENTS
10-
o0 .l , I :!
CONST CRIM CONCRIM NEG
TOPIC
Figure 7: Average Citation/Topic by Opinion Type: 1973
The average number of citations per opinion in the 1983
sample was drastically reduced in every category except the con-
criminal cases. In the other categories the number of citations was
reduced to below 1963 levels. With the decrease in majority cita-
tion, the dissent citation rate comparatively increases. This in-
crease is particularly noteworthy in the constitutional sample,
where the dissent citation average was greater than the majority
citation average.
timization of decisions by reference to other authority. Under this hypothetical relation-
ship, concriminal cases present more value-laden or controversial issues to the court than
do cases with criminal or constitutional issues alone. To this extent, Waits' assertions may
be refined.
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Figure 8: Average Citation/Topic by Opinion Type: 1983
Concriminal citation practice is noteworthy because of the
significant increase in majority citation over the three study years.
The court cited to more sources of authority to support its deci-
sions in this value-laden category.
The results of this analysis may be compared to those ob-
tained in another stidy. Merryman, in his study of the California
Supreme Court," computed the average number of citations for
majority, concurring and dissenting opinions in both 1960 and
1970. 65 The general similarity between the results in this study
64. Merryman, supra note 13.
65. Id. at 392. Note that Merryman's data is for all court cases, is not divided into
categories, and thus is not directly comparable with the data derived here. For 1960, he
found that majority opinions had an average of 18 citations per opinion, concurring opin-
ions had 8 and dissenting opinions had 12. Id. The values for the majority opinions found
by Merryman are roughly comparable to those found in this study, in all but the criminal
category. It appears that the citation rate for criminal cases is significantly below that of
the New York sample average, as well as the average for the California Supreme Court.
The average number of citations per concurring opinion in New York is difficult to com-
pare with the values for the Merryman study because of the small number of such opinions
in the sample. The Merryman figure does seem roughly comparable to those found in the
New York sample. The number of citations found in California opinions in 1970 were: 21
for the majority, 6 for the concurrences and 6 for the dissents. Thus the California figures
were higher for the majority opinions and lower for the other types of opinions. Id. The
average for the New York sample was slightly higher for the majority opinions, and lower
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
and those in the Merryman study may help in the validation of the
sample taken from the New York cases.
This analysis has revealed that the actual trend was for the
number of citations to increase slightly in 1973 and revert to gen-
erally lower levels in 1983. The average in 1983 may be artifically
high due to the influence of the greatly increased number of cita-
tions in the concriminal category. This increase obscures the gen-
eral downward trend of citations per opinion in 1983.68 The gen-
erally greater citation average in 1973 might be related to a
different judicial attitude during that period. One hypothesis
would relate an increased citation level to court resolution of so-
cially controversial issues which require more sources for legi-
timization. This equation of "activism" with citation practice is
theoretically tenuous, however, and has been met with mixed sup-
port in another study.
67
Thus far two different factors have been implicated in the use
of sources by the court. First, a variation in the total number of
citations according to category has been noted. Second, the con-
currence and dissent rates have been shown to affect the number
of citations. These rates may also be important in that majority,
concurring and dissenting opinions may differ in their use of
sources as authority. In an activist period, for example, a court
may maintain a vigorous minority which emphasizes the use of
"traditional" legal sources, such as cases or statutes.
II. THE DATA
Figure 9 shows the percentage of citations that fall within one
of five categories for each of the three study years. The predomi-
nant source for the court, as one might suspect, is prior case law.
Two-thirds or more of the citations in the sample referred to
cases. Next in importance, not surprisingly, are statutes, which ac-
counted for approximately one-fifth of all citations. Legal trea-
tises, law reviews, and other sources accounted for the remaining
cites (legal treatises at about 5-8%, law reviews at 1-3%, and other
sources at from 0.72-3%).
for the concurring and dissenting opinions.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
67. For the difficulties of determining levels of "activism" from an examination of
citation practice, see Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 274-75, 292. For further discus-
sion of the implications of citation practice, see supra text accompanying notes 54-68.
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Figure 9: Percentage of Citation Sources/Year
Within the cases category, the majority of cases originated within
the state. There were also a significant percentage from other
states, federal courts and the Supreme Court (see Figure 10).
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The proportion of citation sources is of general interest to a
student of the courts. But of even greater practical significance is
the proportion of citations from particular sources within catego-
ries and within majorities, concurrences and dissents (see Figures
11-13).
MAJORITY
80
60-
50-
PERCENTAGE A 1963
OF 40- A 1973TOTAL CITES
30-- N98
CASES STATUTES TREATISES LAW
REVIEWS
TOPICS
Figure 11: Sources of Citation in Majority Opinions by Year
CONCURRENCES
PERCENTAGE 501
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TOTAL CITES 40- A1973
CASES STATUTES TREATISES LAW OTHER
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TOPICS
Figure 12: Sources of Citation in Concurring Opinions by Year
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Figure 13: Sources of Citation in Dissenting Opinions by Year
A. Cases
Cases, as the traditional source of legal precedent, make up a
majority of the citations made by the court (see Figure 9). In
every category and year they outnumber any other source (see
Figures 14-16). The same is true of cases analyzed according to
the type of opinion (see Figures 17-19). Here, only concurring
opinions in 1983 opposed the trend, containing an equal number
of statutes (see Figure 16).
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Of further interest is the proportion of cases cited from
within the state, or from federal or other state courts. Merryman,
in his study of the California Supreme Court, found that a rela-
tively constant two-thirds of all cases cited were from within the
state.68 New York State cases make up more than half of all cita-
tions in our sample (see Figure 10).69
Figures 20-22 show the proportion of citations to cases from
various sources by year and category. As these figures demon-
strate, the proportion of such citations in our sample cases varied
considerably. The basic proportion of citation sources seems to
conform to that reported by Merryman, with decreasing percent-
ages of cases from the Supreme Court and other state and federal
sources. But the New York court in these topic areas seems to cite
from other jurisdictions with greater regularity than the Califor-
nia court.
1963
100
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70 A CONSTITUTIONAL
PERCENTAGE 60 A CRIMINAL
OF 50 E CONCRIMINAL
TOTAL CASES 401
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Figure 20: Case Source by Topic: 1963
68. Merryman, supra note 13, at 399.
69. See supra Figure 10. Comparisons can be made to other studies. Merryman reports
that 4.16% of California's citations were from federal opinions, with 14.84% addititional
citations from the Supreme Court. Merryman, supra note 13, at 400. Only 6% of the cita-
tions in 1970 were from other states. Id.
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These statistics indicate the willingness of the New York
Court of Appeals to turn to the decisions of other state and fed-
eral courts as sources of authority in its opinions. Opinions from
Michigan, California, Maryland and New Jersey were the most
popular out-of-state citations in the 1983 sample. This frequency
of citation may be representative of similar issues confronting
these populous or industrialized states, or indicative of similar le-
gal orientations.
B. Statutes
Statutes are the next most popular traditional source of judi-
cial authority. They account for just under twenty percent of the
court's citations. This is a high percentage in comparison with
other state data. A substantial percentage of cases from other
states contain citations to neither cases nor statutes0 . William
Reynolds has noted that "[o]ne of the most important jobs of any
court is to apply statutes-the expressed desires of a coequal
branch of government." ' 1 Statutes have generally been cited more
frequently in concurring opinions, with the exception of the 1973
court. 2 Citation to statutes was generally lowest in negligence
cases, 73 which is not surprising given that negligence law has been
derived almost exclusively from the common law. Citations to stat-
utes differed greatly among the categories, with constitutional and
concriminal cases citing more statutes than the criminal cases.7 4
C. Legal Treatises
One of the principle reasons for interest in this source is in
determining its acceptability to the court as a source of authority.
It is also possible to determine which treatises are held in esteem
by the judges, and whether those held in esteem have varied over
time. Because of the limitation of this study to the analysis of par-
ticular categories, only treatises which relate to the subject matter
of these categories are implicated in this aspect of the study.
70. Friedman, supra note 8, at 809.
71. Reynolds, supra note 14, at 162.
72. See supra Figures 20-22.
73. See supra Figures 11-13.
74. Id. One exception is in the year 1963, during which citation to statutes in the
criminal category outstripped citation by constitutional or concriminal categories.
1985] 995
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Therefore comparison with other state data must be general in
nature. Friedman and his colleagues noted that there is a lot of
interstate variability in the use of this type of citation. According
to their data, the use has declined somewhat in the past thirty
years.7 This study shows that, while legal treatises were cited
more frequently in the 1973 sample of New York cases, the use of
this type of source was still a significant factor in the 1983 cases .7
The use of these sources also may be representative of the
court's stance in a particular area of law. Such sources tend to
represent the law "as it is," in a crystallized form. Thus, they may
be used when judges wish to maintain the status quo. Their use
has been criticized by commentators as representing a false reli-
ance on an issue of settled law." Some differences may exist
within this group. In Supreme Court opinions, for example, while
legal encyclopedias receive negligible attention, and the Restate-
ments minimal attention, the use of legal treatises is high." Yet
the overall characterization of this group as containing a view of
the law "as it is" is enough to hold this category together. Citation
to this type of source may indicate a more traditional judicial per-
spective on an issue or a certainty of result. Differences in citation
rate may thus indicate differing attitudes, or differing levels of
certainty in the result.
In our sample data, 9 the use of legal treatises is highest in the
negligence cases. In 1963 treatises were used more in constitu-
tional opinions than in criminal ones, but by 1983 the number of
citations in constitutional cases had decreased to zero. Citation to
this source in criminal opinions was at low levels in 1963 and
1983, but slightly higher in 1973.
In contrast, the use of legal treatises has steadily increased in
the concriminal cases. It is interesting to note the relationship be-
tween the type of opinion and the amount of legal treatise cita-
75. Friedman, supra note 8, at 812.
76. See supra Figures 11-13 for the percentage of citations to sources by topic; see
supra Figures 14-16 for the values in majority, concurring and dissenting opinions; see
supra Figures 20-22 for the opinion type data by year.
77. Reynolds, supra note 14, at 153-54. Merryman, in his seminal study of the use of
authority, examines court citation to this category and is very critical of the worth of such
sources. See Merryman, supra note 1, at 629-49.
78. See, e.g., Daniels, supra note 3, at 18 (legal encyclopedias), 17 (restatements), and
16-17 (legal treatises).
79. See supra note 76.
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tion. In 1963 the greatest reliance on such sources was found in
majority opinions. Oddly, in 1973 each type of opinion relied ap-
proximately evenly on this source of authority for, one would as-
sume, frequently opposing views. In 1983 this trend was contin-
ued, with one exception. Here the concurring opinions relied only
on cases and statutes as authority supporting the majority deci-
sion. The majority and dissenting opinions again relied on trea-
tises to the same extent. In general, the majority opinions relied
on treatises to a slightly greater extent than the dissents. This may
indicate that the majorities were maintaining the status quo. But
the slight differences in citation practices between the majority
and dissent in this regard indicate that citation of these sources
cannot, in and of itself, establish a conservative tendency on the
part of the court.
Figure 23, below, provides a list of the cited treatises. These
treatises have been accepted as authority by the court, and may
thus be cited with confidence by the practicing attorney. Finding
sources, such as the American Law Reports, were cited more fre-
quently in 1963 and 1973 than they were in 1983. Treatises by
legal scholars are more frequently cited than general encyclopedic
works or finding tools.
FIGURE 23: TREATISES CITED BY YEAR
SOURCE:
1963: NUMBER OF CITATIONS
A.L.R. 15
L.R.A. 5
Black's Law Dictionary 1
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 1
Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System I
McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations 1
Restatement of the Law of Restitution 1
25 Citations
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1973
A.L.R. 6
N.Y. Jur. 5
Richardson, Richardson on Evidence 4
Wigmore, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence 4
McKinney's C.P.L.R. 2
Prosser, A Handbook of the Law of Torts 2
A.L.R.2d. 2
Underhill, A Treatise on the Law of Criminal Evidence I
Wharton's Criminal Evidence 1
Am. Jur. 1
Carmody-Wait, Cyclopedia of N.Y. Practice 1
Cohen and Karger, The Powers of the N.Y. Court of Appeals I
C.J.S. 1
Harper and James, The Law of Torts 1
Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 1
Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation 1
Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts 1
Restatement of the Law of Restitution 1
Weinstein-Koren-Miller, N.Y. Civil Practice 1
37 Citations
1983
Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts 6
Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 5
A.L.R.2d. 3
Harper and James, The Law of Torts 2
A.L.R. I
A.L.R. Federal 1
C.J.S. Corporations 1
Fletcher's Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations I
McCormick, McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence 1
N.Y. Jur. 2d 1
N.Y. Pattern Jury Instructions I
McKinney's C.P.L.R. 1
Weinberger, N.Y. Products Liability 1
24 Citations
D. Law Reviews and Legal Periodicals
As was the case with legal treatises, one of the principal rea-
sons for interest in this category is in determining their acceptabil-
ity to the courts as a source of authority. The trend, as reported
in other studies, shows an increased use of such periodicals. 80 Law
reviews may be seen as a source of more innovative concepts of
law, and provide the possibility of "bootlegging" nonlegal mate-
80. Friedman, supra note 8, at 812.
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rial into the court opinion.81 Courts that are more innovative, and
have greater discretion, tend to cite to law reviews more fre-
quently.82 In the terms of this study's hypotheses, law reviews re-
present the opportunity to bring less traditional social or value
laden material into the court via a "legal" vehicle.8
Not all commentators support the use of law reviews by the
courts. Some feel that their influence is too great, and that it,
while seemingly nonpartisan, is an influence biased towards special
litigants or parties.8 4 This attitude, though rare, coupled with a
reluctance to cite nontraditional sources, might affect citation
levels.
Law review articles have historically been characterized by a
low rate of citation in the court of appeals.8 5 Their highest pro-
portion of citations comes in majority opinions in 1973, and in the
majority and dissenting opinions in 1983. This finding provides a
degree of support for the earlier conclusion that the 1973 cases
exhibited characteristics that might be indicative of a more "ac-
tivist" court, such as increased citation number.8 '
Once again, opinions that might present opposing views have
relied on less traditional sources of citation. A possible explana-
tion is that in these disputes both parties search the available liter-
ature for any source, traditional or not, for the support of their
view. Differences exist in legal periodicals in terms of their per-
spective on the law and social problems. One hypothesis for fur-
ther study is that dissenting and majority opinions cite to different
types of periodicals. For example, each may cite in greater per-
centages to practitioner-focused periodicals or to law reviews. Le-
gal periodical use according to category is relatively consistent. Ci-
tation in the 1983 criminal cases provides a contrast however,
with an abnormally high percentage of citations to this source.
Scurlock, in his study of citation practices in criminal case opin-
81. Id. at 814. "Bootlegging" refers to the incorporation of nonlegal knowledge or
analysis into a court opinion through reference to a "legal" source. Law review authors can
act as the transmitters of such nonlegal knowledge. Watson's theory of judicial decision
making is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 94-95.
82. Id.; see also Kagan, supra note 17, at 991-92.
83. Friedman, supra note 8, at 814-15.
84. Scurlock, supra note 5, at 260; see also Daniels,
supra note 3, at 15.
85. See supra note 76.
86. See supra text accompanying note 68.
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ions s7 argues that such sources are often used to resolve disputes
regarding specific issues that are "not covered, or not covered ad-
equately by the cases and statutes, and where non-legal knowledge
is indispensable for a proper solution of the case." The 1983
results provide some support for this hypothesis, since the per-
centage of legal periodical citations in that year came almost ex-
clusively from a case debating the use of hypnosis to aid victim
recall.8 9
E. Other
This last category represents the use of more unusual or
"non-legal" sources in judicial opinions. Numerous studies have
been performed on the Supreme Court's use of such sources in
opinions9 0 The use in state courts has received less attention and
is relatively low, at 0.6% of citations in Friedman's state court
study. 1
These sources, whatever size component they may be of the
court's citations, are important for reasons based on theories of
judicial decision making. Waits, for example, noted that the infor-
mation given to the courts about social conditions must be used in
making decisions.92 One problem of particular relevance to this
study is that of communication-how information about societal
conditions or value choices is presented to the court. As Waits ob-
served, "[l]egal rulings must be made with an eye toward societal
conditions, but it is much harder to say how judges are supposed
to determine what those conditions are." 93 Watson has developed
a view of legal culture which implies that although any legal
change must begin outside the legal culture, it must always be
translated through it before an actual change will occur. 4 Thus,
87. Scurlock, supra note 5.
88. Id. at 231.
89. See infra Appendix A, People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466
N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983).
90. C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND HISTORY 17 (1969); see also Daniels, supra
note 3, at 19-21.
91. Friedman, supra note 8, at 817. Note that this data represents the average from
1940 to 1970. It should be lower than the average for more recent sample years.
92. Waits, supra note 7, at 925-26.
93. Id. at 924.
94. Watson, Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1121,
1156 (1983).
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the impetus for change begins in society at large, and it must be
brought into the legal culture by lawyers so that lawmakers and
judges can act upon it.95 Use of these sources by the courts is an
example of this process in action.
Another interesting trend observed in the present study was
in the lack of reliance upon "other" sources, particularly in the
1973 and 1983 samples. The levels of use in the 1963 sample
were much higher. The "other" sources in these opinions tended
to consist mainly of legislative history, although newspaper articles
and statements of organized societies were also considered. Thus
the types of "other" sources used were a mixture of traditional
(such as legislative history) and nontraditional (such as academic
history books, or newspaper articles) sources. The use of such
materials in the 1983 sample was minimal, with the exception of
the use of medical journal reports on hypnosis in one criminal
case.
9 6
CONCLUSION
The court of appeals has exhibited certain patterns in its cita-
tion practices, principally in the variation in citation practice be-
tween categories of cases. These categories were chosen for study
because of the differing types of disputes they presented to the
court for resolution. It was hypothesized that citation practice
would vary between these categories. Waits' conception of the
role of value choices in judicial decisions,97 and Watson's view of
legal culture,98 implicated a relationship between the type of issue
before the court, and the sources of information brought into the
court to aid in resolution of the dispute.9 Certain types of dis-
putes, such as those containing constitutional issues, are more
"value-laden." 100 Information about value choices and societal
conditions must be brought into the court by some vehicle, either
through traditional sources or "extralegal" means.101 Thus, differ-
ences in court citation practice can reflect differences in this pro-
95. Id. at 1154.
96. See supra note 89.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37 & 92-93.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 92-95.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 29-36.
100. See supra text accompanying note 34.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 92-95.
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cess between disputes which present differing degrees of
controversy.
The results of this study clearly show differences in objective
measures of court behavior between different categories of dis-
putes. Concriminal cases presented the most value laden issues to
the court, as measured by opinion length, citation number and ci-
tation type. Those constitutional disputes not involving criminal
issues followed. To this extent, Waits' assessment of the value at-
tached to different disputes can be refined. Criminal and negli-
gence issues were next in these objective measures of court behav-
ior. One surprising result of this investigation was the high level
of citation in negligence cases. A possible explanation was found
in the rapidly expanding definition of negligence itself over the
term of the study.
In citing to sources, judges do not just seek authority for their
decisions; they also legitimize the sources they cite. Data from this
study can be used by the practicing attorney who is concerned
about the types of sources that seem to hold authority for the
court. In particular, it was found that the New York Court of Ap-
peals is not reluctant to cite from the decisions of other jurisdic-
tions. Court citation practices include significant percentages of ci-
tations to both legal treatises and law reviews. Other,
''extralegal," material is also cited by the court.
The most important result of a preliminary study of this na-
ture is in the avenues for further research it suggests to others.
Two aspects of this framework invite further scrutiny.10 2 First, the
role of the lawyer and law clerk in transmitting value choices and
information to the court could be more clearly studied. Court
briefs could be compared to court opinions to determine whether
there are any significant differences in citation practice, and to
test the degree to which the courts are forced, or choose, to go
outside the confines of advocate's briefs for authority. Second, the
categorization of sources could be more clearly defined. The
broad categories of sources used here, for example legal treatises
or periodicals, contain disparate types of material. A classification
system could be developed which might explain the seemingly
contradictory reliance of opposing sides upon the "same" mate-
102. Other students of court behavior have also suggested these and other investiga-
tions. See, e.g., T. M AvELL, supra note 6.
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rial. That is, it may be possible to show that the opposing camps
are relying upon different types of material within the same gen-
eral category.
MARY ANNE BOBINSKI
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APPENDIX A
THE CASES:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1963
Hartley Holding Corp. v. Gabel, 13 N.Y.2d 306, 196 N.E.2d 537,
247 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1963).
St. Clair v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 72, 192 N.E.2d 15,
242 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 970 (1964).
People v.Johnston, 13 N.Y.2d 66, 192 N.E.2d 11, 242 N.Y.S.2d 38
(1963).
People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d
734 (1963).
Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port of New York Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 379,
190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963).
Bradley v. Waterfront Comm'r, 12 N.Y.2d 276, 189 N.E.2d 601, 239
N.Y.S.2d 276 (1963).
1973
Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous, 33 N.Y.2d 161, 305 N.E.2d 903, 350
N.Y.S.2d 889 (1973).
People ex rel. Calloway v. Skinner, 33 N.Y.2d 161, 305 N.E.2d 716,
347 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1973).
241 East 22nd St. Corp. v. City Rent Agency, 33 N.Y.2d 134, 305
N.E.2d 760, 350 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1973).
Trails West, Inc. v. Wolff, 32 N.Y.2d 207, 298 N.E.2d 52, 344
N.Y.S.2d 863 (1973).
Blye v. Glove-Wernicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 15, 300 N.E.2d 710,
347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973).
Shapiro v. City of New York, 32 N.Y.2d 96, 296 N.E.2d 230, 343
N.Y.S.2d 323, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 804, reh'g denied,
414 U.S. 1087 (1973).
Shelofsy v. Helsby, 32 N.Y.2d 54, 295 N.E.2d 774, 343 N.Y.S.2d
98, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 804 (1973).
1983
Board of Educ. v. Ambach, 60 N.Y.2d 758, 457 N.E.2d 775, 469
N.Y.S.2d 669 (1983).
Miller v. Coughlin, 59 N.Y.2d 490, 452 N.E.2d 1241, 465
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N.Y.S.2d 913 (1983).
Mayflower Nursing Home v. Office of Health Sys. Management, 59
N.Y.2d 935, 453 N.E.2d 528, 466 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1983).
L. Pamela P. v. Frank S. 59 N.Y.2d 1, 449 N.E.2d 713, 462
N.Y.S.2d 819 (1983).
Saumell v. New York Racing Ass'n, 58 N.Y.2d 231, 447 N.E.2d 706,
460 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1983).
People v. Charles F., 60 N.Y.2d 474, 458 N.E.2d 801, 470
N.Y.S.2d 342 (1983).
Hardeman v. Mendon Leasing Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 892, 447 N.E.2d
47, 460 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1983).
United States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 59
N.Y.2d 401, 452 N.E.2d 1199, 465 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1983).
2. CRIMINAL LAW
1963
People v. Vellucci, 13 N.Y.2d 665, 191 N.E.2d 469, 240 N.Y.S.2d
992 (1963).
People v. Fearon, 13 N.Y.2d 59, 192 N.E.2d 8, 242 N.Y.S.2d 33
(1963).
People v. Van Sickle, 13 N.Y.2d 61, 192 N.E.2d 9, 242 N.Y.S.2d 34
(1963).
People v. Meckler, 13 N.Y.2d 168, 193 N.E.2d 891, 244 N.Y.S.2d
65 (1963).
People v. Cender, 13 N.Y.2d 16, 191 N.E.2d 464, 240 N.Y.S.2d
417 (1963).
People v. Marshall, 13 N.Y.2d 28, 191 N.E.2d 798, 241 N.Y.S.2d
417 (1963).
People v. Kelly, 12 N.Y.2d 248, 189 N.E.2d 477, 238 N.Y.S.2d 934
(1963).
1973
People v. Abdul Sarim Al-Kanani, 33 N.Y.2d 260, 307 N.E.2d 43,
351 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 916 (1974).
People v. Cerami, 33 N.Y.2d 243, 306 N.E.2d 799, 351 N.Y.S.2d
681 (1973).
People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 300 N.E.2d 139, 346
N.Y.S.2d 793 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
People v. Henson, 33 N.Y.2d 63, 304 N.E.2d 358, 349 N.Y.S.2d
657 (1973).
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People v. Townsend, 33 N.Y.2d 37, 300 N.E.2d 722, 347 N.Y.S.2d
187 (1973).
People v. Beaudet, 32 N.Y.2d 371, 298 N.E.2d 647, 345 N.Y.S.2d
495 (1973).
People v. Palermo, 32 N.Y.2d 222, 298 N.E.2d 61, 344 N.Y.S.2d
874 (1973).
1983
People v. Alicea, 61 N.Y.2d 23, 459 N.E.2d 177, 471 N.Y.S.2d 68
(1983).
People v. Canty, 60 N.Y.2d 830, 457 N.E.2d 800, 469 N.Y.S.2d
693 (1983).
People v. Glover, 60 N.Y.2d 783, 457 N.E.2d 783, 469 N.Y.S.2d
677 (1983).
People v. Smith, 59 N.Y.2d 156, 451 N.E.2d 157, 464 N.Y.S.2d
399 (1983).
People v. Hopkins, 58 N.Y.2d 1079, 449 N.E.2d 419, 462 N.Y.S.2d
639 (1983).
People v. Morales, 58 N.Y.2d 1008, 448 N.E.2d 796, 461 N.Y.S.2d
1011 (1983).
People v. Kaminski, 58 N.Y.2d 886, 447 N.E.2d 43, 460 N.Y.S.2d
495 (1983).
People v. Cofresi, 60 N.Y.2d 728, 456 N.E.2d 1189, 469 N.Y.S.2d
75 (1983).
People v. Davis, 58 N.Y.2d 1102, 449 N.E.2d 710, 462 N.Y.S.2d
816 (1983).
People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d
255 (1983).
People v. Tinsley, 58 N.Y.2d 990, 448 N.E.2d 790, 461 N.Y.S.2d
1005 (1983).
3. CONCRIMINAL
1963
People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.
148 (1963).
People v. Fritch, 13 N.Y.2d 119, 192 N.E.2d 713, 243 N.Y.S.2d
119 (1963).
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1973
People v. Bornholdt, 33 N.Y.2d 75, 305 N.E.2d 461, 350 N.Y.S.2d
369 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974).
People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 300 N.E.2d 411, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33
(1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973).
People v. Stridiron, 33 N.Y.2d 287, 307 N.E.2d 242, 352 N.Y.S.2d
601 (1973).
People v. Heller, 33 N.Y.2d 314, 307 N.E.2d 805, 352 N.Y.S.2d
601 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 944 (1974).
1983
People v. Felix, 58 N.Y.2d 156, 446 N.E.2d 757, 460 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1983).
4. NEGLIGENCE
1963
Carradine v. City of New York, 13 N.Y.2d 291, 196 N.E.2d 259, 245
N.Y.S.2d 620 (1963).
Jackson v. Associated Dry Goods, 13 N.Y.2d 112, 192 N.E.2d 167,
242 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1963).
Beauchamp v. New York City Hous. Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 400, 190
N.E.2d 886, 240 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1963).
1973
Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, 33 N.Y.2d 397, 308 N.E.2d 886,
353 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1973).
Feblot v. New York Times Co., 32 N.Y.2d 486, 299 N.E.2d 672, 346
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1973).
Rogers v. Dorchester Assocs., 32 N.Y.2d 553, 300 N.E.2d 403, 347
N.Y.S.2d 22 (1973).
Margolin v. New York Life Ins., 32 N.Y.2d 149, 279 N.E.2d 80, 344
N.Y.S.2d 336 (1973).
Sega v. State, 60 N.Y.2d 183, 456 N.E.2d 1174, 469 N.Y.S.2d 51
(1983).
Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 59 N.Y.2d 239, 451 N.E.2d 195,
464 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1983).
Chase Manhattan Bank v. Edwards, 59 N.Y.2d 817, 451 N.E.2d
486, 464 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1983).
Kusk by Marzalek v. City of Buffalo, 59 N.Y.2d 26, 449 N.E.2d 725,
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462 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1983).
De Angelis v. Lutheran Medical Center, 58 N.Y.2d 1053, 449 N.E.2d
406, 462 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1983).
Garret v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 58 N.Y.2d 253, 447 N.E.2d 717, 460
N.Y.S.2d 774 (1983).
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